

Exhibit 6

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE**

DINNER TABLE ACTION, et al.,

Plaintiffs.

v.

WILLIAM J. SCHNEIDER, in his official
capacity as Chairman of the Maine
Commission on Governmental Ethics and
Election Practices, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 24-cv-00430-KFW

Magistrate Judge
Karen Frink Wolf

DECLARATION OF
DAVID M. PRIMO

I, David M. Primo, Ph.D., hereby declare as follows:

1. I am over the age of 18 and reside in Rochester, New York.
2. I am a professor of political science, with tenure, in the School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Rochester, where I also hold a joint appointment as a professor of business administration at the Simon Business School.
3. In 2012, I was named the inaugural holder of the Ani and Mark Gabrellian Professorship, which was created to recognize “a multidisciplinary scholar and teacher whose work bridges two or more academic fields” with the goal of “better understand[ing] the most vital political and economic issues of our era.” I joined the Rochester faculty in 2002 after receiving my Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University. I also have an MA in Economics from Stanford, an MA in Political Science from Brown University, and a BA in Economics and Honors Political Science from Brown.
4. My research in campaign finance is primarily quantitative and focuses on the impact of campaign finance laws and campaign spending on features of democracy such as

perceptions of government and electoral competitiveness. This research is widely cited in academic publications and in policy debates, and I am nationally recognized for my work in this area. In 2015 I was invited to serve on a task force of scholars charged with preparing a report on the state of scholarly knowledge about campaign finance. Jeffrey Milyo and I subsequently co-authored *Campaign Finance and American Democracy: What the Public Really Thinks and Why It Matters*, a book-length treatment of the interrelationship between public opinion and campaign finance. This peer-reviewed book was published by a leading press in American politics, the University of Chicago Press.

5. I have been asked by the attorneys for the plaintiffs in *Dinner Table Action, et al. v. Schneider, et al.* to evaluate the expert testimony of Christopher Robertson, an expert witness retained by EqualCitizens. I reviewed his report and his deposition transcript. I also was either already acquainted with the literature he cited, or reviewed the same. I am being compensated for my work on this case on a flat fee basis: \$12,000 for the preparation of this report; \$3,000 for participation in a deposition and deposition preparation (if I am deposed); and \$3,000 for attendance at trial (if I am called to testify). In addition, I will be reimbursed for travel and other out-of-pocket expenses.

6. In my report, attached hereto as Exhibit 1, I explain the problems with Robertson's literature review, experimental design, and statistical analyses. Based on the expert opinions expressed in my report, I conclude that Robertson's report and deposition do not support the conclusions he reaches. I authored my report. If called to testify, I could and would competently testify to the statements herein and in my report.

7. I conclude that the survey experiments conducted by Robertson are flawed both in their design and in how he interprets the results. These experiments do not establish that a

\$5,000 contribution is an “inflection point” for corruption risk, and they do not show that implementing a \$5,000 contribution limit on Super PAC contributions will reduce the appearance of corruption.

8. These experiments instead show that respondents think contributions at the contribution limit at issue in this case—\$5,000—are as corrupting as a \$50 million contribution.

9. They also show that if you provide respondents with no information about a fictional state except that it is filled with corporations seeking to buy venal politicians, then they will prefer less money in that system.

10. In my opinion, the experiments conducted by Christopher Robertson for this case do not advance the scientific literature on campaign finance and public opinion. If I were reviewing his report as an article submission for a peer-reviewed scientific journal, I would recommend rejection.

* * *

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. Executed on this 22nd day of April, 2025 in Rochester, New York.

/s/ David M. Primo
David M. Primo, Ph.D.

EXPERT REPORT
Dinner Table Action, et al. v. Schneider, et al.
David M. Primo, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION

I am a professor of political science, with tenure, in the School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Rochester, where I also hold a joint appointment as a professor of business administration at the Simon Business School. In 2012, I was named the inaugural holder of the Ani and Mark Gabrellian Professorship, which was created to recognize “a multidisciplinary scholar and teacher whose work bridges two or more academic fields” with the goal of “better understand[ing] the most vital political and economic issues of our era.” I joined the Rochester faculty in 2002 after receiving my Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University. I also have an MA in Economics from Stanford, an MA in Political Science from Brown University, and a BA in Economics and Honors Political Science from Brown.

My research in American politics, campaign finance, corporate strategy beyond markets, fiscal policy, statistical methods, and political bargaining has been published in peer-reviewed journals including *American Journal of Political Science*; *Business and Politics*; *Economics and Politics*; *Election Law Journal*; *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*; *Journal of Politics*; *Journal of Theoretical Politics*; and *Strategic Management Journal*. I have also published four peer-reviewed books: *The Plane Truth: Airline Crashes, the Media, and Transportation Policy* (co-authored with Roger W. Cobb, Brookings Institution Press, 2003); *Rules and Restraint: Government Spending and the Design of Institutions* (University of Chicago Press, 2007); *A Model Discipline: Political Science and the Logic of Representations* (co-authored with Kevin A. Clarke, Oxford University Press, 2012); and *Campaign Finance and American Democracy: What the Public Really Thinks and Why It Matters* (co-authored with Jeffrey D. Milyo, University of Chicago Press, 2020). *Rules and Restraint* was awarded the 2008 Alan Rosenthal Prize by the Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science Association. This award is given annually

for the best publication in legislative studies by a young scholar of importance to legislators and legislative staff and of merit in strengthening the practice of representative democracy. I have received numerous grants to support my research, including from the National Science Foundation.

At the University of Rochester, I teach courses in the Political Science Department's PhD program, the Simon Business School's MBA and other graduate programs, and at the undergraduate level. I have received three teaching awards at the University of Rochester: the 2005 Goergen Award for Distinguished Achievement and Artistry in Undergraduate Education; the 2005 Undergraduate Professor of the Year Award, given by the University of Rochester Students' Association; and the 2018 Edward Peck Curtis Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching, a university-wide teaching prize.

My research in campaign finance is primarily quantitative and focuses on the impact of campaign finance laws and campaign spending on features of democracy such as perceptions of government and electoral competitiveness. This research is widely cited in academic publications and in policy debates, and I am nationally recognized for my work in this area. In 2015 I was invited to serve on a task force of scholars charged with preparing a report on the state of scholarly knowledge about campaign finance. Jeffrey Milyo and I subsequently co-authored *Campaign Finance and American Democracy: What the Public Really Thinks and Why It Matters*, a book-length treatment of the interrelationship between public opinion and campaign finance. This peer-reviewed book was published by a leading press in American politics, the University of Chicago Press.

I have served as an expert in several campaign finance cases, including *McConnell v. FEC*, and signed on to amicus briefs in others, including *Citizens United v. FEC*. Research I conducted as part of expert work in *Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett* was cited by US Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts in his majority opinion for that case. A full list of the cases in which I was retained as an expert appears in my curriculum vitae, which is attached and is incorporated into this expert report by reference.

For this rebuttal report, I have been asked by the attorneys for the plaintiffs in *Dinner Table Action, et al. v. Schneider, et al.* to evaluate the expert testimony of Christopher Robertson, an expert witness retained by EqualCitizens. I am being compensated for my work on this case on a flat fee basis: \$12,000 for the preparation of this report; \$3,000 for participation in a deposition and deposition preparation (if I am deposed); and \$3,000 for attendance at trial (if I am called to testify). In addition, I will be reimbursed for travel and other out-of-pocket expenses.

In this report, I will discuss the problems with Robertson's literature review, the design of his two experiments (denoted Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 below), and interpretation of his statistical results. Based on this analysis, I conclude that Robertson's report and deposition do not support the conclusions he reaches. Specifically:

- Studies using real-world data do not find that contribution limits reduce the appearance of corruption or improve perceptions of government. These studies are cited by Robertson—so he is aware of them—but he fails to address their important findings in his report.
- Robertson's design of Experiment 1 fails to take into account the prior literature, he misinterprets his own findings, and his results actually show that respondents think a \$5,000 contribution creates the same risk of corruption as a \$50,000,000 contribution. This experiment suggests the \$5,000 contribution limit at issue in this case will have no effect on the appearance of corruption.
- Robertson's Experiment 2 lacks external validity (meaning it does not apply to real-world situations) and is designed, intentionally or not, to generate a particular set of findings.

This report proceeds as follows. In the next section, I show that Robertson's literature review fails to discuss crucial findings in the literature regarding campaign finance laws and the appearance of

corruption—results that are at odds with his conclusions. Then, I analyze each of his experiments, discussing the limitations of his experimental designs—including a failure to build on the previous literature—and the analyses he conducts.

STUDIES USING REAL-WORLD DATA DO NOT FIND THAT CONTRIBUTION LIMITS REDUCE THE APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION OR IMPROVE PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT.

Robertson cites relevant scholarly work in his literature review, but the review veers between summarizing a paper in some cases and assessing a paper in others. Most importantly, he fails to discuss crucial findings in these sources that are at odds with his findings.

First, Robertson, in discussing Shaw et al. (2021), fails to discuss two key findings in their book. These authors find, using survey data matched to state campaign finance laws, that “more restrictive [state] campaign finance regulations are associated with *higher* levels of perceived corruption” (Shaw et al. 2021, 79). They also show that state campaign finance laws do not affect trust in government by altering perceptions of corruption (Shaw et al. 2021, ch. 4). These are not cherry-picked findings. Rather, they are fleshed out *in an entire chapter of the book*.

Second, Robertson, in citing my book with Jeffrey Milyo (mentioned earlier in my report), fails to address what we write is “*perhaps the most important finding in this book*, which in practical terms calls into question four decades of legal justifications for campaign finance reform” (Milyo and Primo 2020, 145, emphasis added). Specifically, we devote an entire chapter to utilizing decades of survey data to assess the effect of state campaign finance laws on trust or confidence in state government, with the appearance of corruption as a mechanism linking the two. Our dataset spans the years 1987 to 2017 and includes nearly 60,000 individual-level observations from more than fifty surveys. These individual-level observations are matched to state-level variables including, importantly, campaign finance laws. We use the fact that state laws change over time and vary across states to estimate the effects of campaign finance laws on perceptions of government. We study several types of policies, including campaign

contribution limits for individuals and corporations, and measure the yearly presence or absence of such restrictions or regulations in each state.

Using regression analysis, Milyo and I find no substantively meaningful effects of campaign finance laws, including bans on corporate independent expenditures, on trust in government. In addition, we find that limits on corporate campaign contributions *reduce* trust in government, albeit by a small amount. These results are summarized Table 8.4 from our book, reproduced below.

TABLE 8.4 The effect of state campaign finance laws on trust in state government, 1987–2017

	(1)	(2)
CF law count	-.26 (.28)	
Regime 1: corp cont lim		-1.88** (.75)
Regime 2: (corp + ind) cont lim		-1.74*** (.45)
Regime 3: (corp + ind) cont lim + gub pub fund		-.23 (1.13)
Regime 4: (corp + ind) cont lim + (gub + leg) pub fund		.08 (1.47)
Corporate independent expenditure bans		.37 (.75)
Legislative term limits	-.66 (.64)	-.63 (.59)
Unified Democratic govt	-1.86** (.69)	-1.84** (.68)
Unified Republican govt	-.65 (.71)	-.59 (.71)
Resp pty same as unified govt pty	5.27*** (.44)	5.27*** (.44)
Resp pty diff than unified govt pty	-3.37*** (.58)	-3.36*** (.58)
Unemployment rate	-.79*** (.19)	-.80*** (.20)
Ln state per capita income	12.65* (6.92)	13.55* (7.06)
Ln state per capita govt spending	-5.22** (2.46)	-4.91** (2.33)
Ln state population	3.46 (3.17)	3.30 (2.87)
R^2	.20	.20
N	59,117	59,117

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. All specifications include state fixed effects; indicator variables for year and party, as well as interaction terms for respondent party and year; demographic variables as specified in table 8.1; indicator variables for missing income, party, and party concordance; and indicator variables for question version and number of possible responses. *** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$.

In our book, we also conduct supplementary analyses focusing on the effect of *Citizens United*, with similarly statistically insignificant results. See the third column at the bottom of Table 8.6 below, also reproduced from our book. The results in Table 8.6 show that there are no before and after changes in trust levels for individuals living in states whose laws were affected by *Citizens United* (i.e., states which had a ban on corporate independent expenditures). If corporate independent expenditure bans were so harmful to perceptions of government, we should have seen a downward shift in trust in states where bans were “turned off” by *Citizens United*.

TABLE 8.6 The effect of Clean Elections and *Citizens United* on trust in state government

	Clean Elections (Arizona, Connecticut, Maine)		
	Before Clean Elections	After Clean Elections	Effect of Clean Elections on state trust
Democrat	5.41*** (1.89)	1.41 (2.73)	-4.00**
Republican	3.10 (3.81)	4.00** (1.61)	+ .90
Independent	5.58*** (1.87)	3.28*** (1.18)	-2.30
	<i>Citizens United</i> (twenty-three state-level laws affected)		
	Before <i>Citizens United</i>	After <i>Citizens United</i>	Effect of <i>Citizens United</i> on state trust
Democrat	2.87** (1.31)	.96 (1.38)	-1.91
Republican	.79 (1.72)	2.52** (1.22)	+1.73
Independent	2.78** (1.36)	1.97 (1.39)	-.81

Note: The first two columns of cells include coefficients and robust standard errors clustered by state for a regression identical to the regimes regression from table 8.4, with the following changes. In both the *Citizens United* and Clean Elections regressions, we include a new set of interaction terms for states affected by *Citizens United* or a Clean Elections reform, respectively. *Before* reflects an interaction term for (party *X* pre-event) for six years prior to the event, and *after* refers to an interaction term for (party *X* postevent) for the years after the event. The third column reports the differences in the coefficients for each group, with statistical significance based on *F*-tests of whether the two coefficients are the same. $N = 59,117$ for both regressions. In the *Citizens United* regression, there are 6,998 observations in the treatment group prior to the event, and 7,405 after the event. For the Clean Elections regression, the comparable figures are 410 and 1,227. *** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$.

As another way to get at this question, we also look at trends in trust before-and-after the *Citizens United* decision and find that *Citizens United* did not have the predicted negative effects on perceptions of government that many believed it would. See the lower right of Figure 8.1 below, reproduced from our book, where the trends in trust pre-and-post *Citizens United* are essentially a flat line.




FIGURE 8.1. Trends in state-level trust, before and after campaign finance reform

Note: Solid lines depict the estimates of trends in trust before and after the respective reforms, with the 95 percent confidence intervals plotted with dotted lines. The range of the y axis approximates a ± 1 standard deviation change in the state trust measure.

My book-length analysis of the effects of campaign finance laws on public opinion, therefore, strongly suggests that the Maine law at issue in this case will not have a meaningful effect on attitudes toward government. Robertson’s report, in failing to discuss these findings, offers a misleading account of the state of the academic literature on this question.

Other scholars have reached similar conclusions about the limited effects of laws on perceptions. Recent research on perceptions of Super PACs cited by Robertson (Goodliffe and Townsend 2024) supports the view that campaign finance laws are unlikely to affect perceptions. These authors write, “Given our results, we expect that future policy changes focused on reducing distrust are unlikely to be successful in their aim” (Goodliffe and Townsend 2024, 7). This matches the assessment of Persily and Lammie (2004, 174), also cited by Robertson. After studying decades of public opinion data, they conclude, “For those who would look to campaign finance reform to restore ‘confidence in the system of representative [g]overnment,’ they may be disappointed by the intractability and psychological roots of that lack of confidence.”

Robertson, in discussing Persily and Lammie (2004), states that he prefers the experimental research he conducts to the observational work reflected in their research (and, by extension, in Shaw et al. and Primo and Milyo, discussed earlier) because it is more difficult to make causal claims from observational research. This position, however, fails to acknowledge the external validity problems that plague improperly designed experiments. Specifically, survey experiments, by necessity, create artificial environments, and to the extent that the artificial environments deviate markedly from real-world conditions, we should not expect the results to apply in real-world settings. This will be a major issue in Robertson's second experiment, discussed below.

There is another reason why observational research focused on *actual* changes in *actual* laws — like that of Persily and Lammie (2004), Primo and Milyo (2020), and Shaw et al. (2021)—is an important part of understanding public attitudes toward campaign finance: Americans believe that politics is fundamentally corrupt. In original survey research we conducted for our book, Milyo and I found that Americans perceived everyday political activities to be corrupt. For instance, about two-thirds of the Americans we surveyed believed that a politician taking a position due to pressure from party leaders, to secure favorable media coverage, or to make the other party look bad was likely to be corrupt behavior. Since Americans see corruption everywhere they look, it is no surprise that 80% of Americans we surveyed for our book thought that “the campaign finance system is corrupt” (Primo and Milyo 2020, 8).

It would be a mistake, however, to take a data point like this (or any of Robertson's results) and conclude that contribution limits, whether on direct contributions to candidates or to Super PACs, will help improve the situation. Simply *asking* people if they believe a contribution is corrupt or if politics is corrupt *does not tell you if laws restricting contributions will improve attitudes toward government*. Why? First, perceptions of corruption and attitudes toward government more generally are driven by a multitude of factors. Money in politics may be an easy target, but it may not be the root cause of Americans' mistrust of politicians. Second, restricting campaign contributions will not do much if

Americans believe even small contributions are potentially corrupting. Third, Americans are woefully misinformed about campaign finance laws, so the effects of these laws on attitudes will be indirect: campaign finance laws impact the legislative process and elections, and Americans update their beliefs about the role of money in politics accordingly. These indirect effects, to the extent they exist, will be difficult, if not impossible, to measure in an experimental setting.

To summarize: *I am aware of no published research of real-world changes in campaign finance laws that has found those laws to have meaningful effects on perceptions of corruption or attitudes toward government.* To the contrary, multiple studies—including my own—that have examined decades of public opinion data find that these laws simply do not shift attitudes toward government.

The next step in my report is to show that the two experiments detailed in Robertson’s report do not establish what he claims they establish. In other words, even if one views an experimental approach as superior to studying the real-world effects of campaign finance laws, one still should not have confidence in his findings.

ROBERTSON’S DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT 1 FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PRIOR LITERATURE, HE MISINTERPRETS HIS OWN FINDINGS, AND HIS RESULTS ACTUALLY SHOW THAT RESPONDENTS THINK A \$5,000 CONTRIBUTION CREATES THE SAME RISK OF CORRUPTION AS A \$50,000,000 CONTRIBUTION.

In the first experiment, Robertson provided respondents with the following stimulus: “Please think about the risk that a politician would sell a policy outcome, like a vote on a bill, in exchange for a financial contribution to a committee supporting his or her re-election. Doing so violates his or her oath and creates a risk of prosecution, if discovered. Suppose the contribution was \$X” (Robertson 2025a, 5). Respondents were randomly assigned to different treatment conditions varying X: \$5, \$50, \$500, \$5,000, \$50,000, \$500,000, \$5,000,000, and \$50,000,000. They were asked how likely they thought it was that a politician sell a policy outcome for that amount. (Implied in the question is that the contributions in question are legal, though the experiment would have been more precise had it stated

that explicitly.) Robertson's expert report offers no explanation for why he picked these amounts, and in a deposition he explained, "So I decided this logarithmic scale where you multiply it by ten each time would provide a big enough range that ... if there was a discontinuity ... that we could see it" (Robertson 2025b, 29). This choice, however, leaves out a range of values corresponding to many existing contribution limits (i.e., limits between \$500 and \$5,000). This turns out to have important implications for the conclusions he can draw from his experiment.

The choice is particularly odd given Robertson's citation to DeBell and Iyengar (2021). These authors' public opinion research—which is very similar in structure to Robertson's first experiment—shows that "[mean perceptions of corruption] rose sharply from .34 to .44 as contributions increased from \$50 to \$1,000, but then increased only slightly from .44 to .48 as contributions increased from \$1,000 to \$5,000. This indicates that perceptions of corruption are relatively inelastic within the \$1,000 to \$5,000 range" (DeBell and Iyengar 2021, 294). (Inelastic is a technical term meaning that a change in one value produces no change in another value. For instance, we say that demand for a product is relatively inelastic if it takes a huge price increase before sales of that product begin to decline.) Given that he included this paper in his literature review, it is strange that Robertson did not choose values between \$500 and \$5,000 in his experiment or at least address why he chose not to, given previous research. What's more, it is not clear to me how Robertson's experiment is an advance over DeBell and Iyengar's work.

Robertson not only fails to set up his experiment in a sensible way, but he also misinterprets his own findings. Robertson writes, "we found a clear relationship between the amount of money contributed and perceived likelihood that the elected official would sell a policy outcome. ... As Figure 1 displays, the relationship between size of contribution and likelihood of selling a policy outcome has a clear discontinuity around \$5,000, meaning that respondents perceive contributions below \$5,000 to be qualitatively different than contributions at or above that amount. ... Experiment 1 shows that larger

financial contributions cause greater perceived risk of *quid pro quo* corruption, and that perceived risk is greater and stable above \$4,999. To put it another way, \$5,000 appears to be an inflection point in perceptions of quid pro quo corruption” (Robertson 2025a, 6-7). Robertson elaborated in a deposition, arguing that “respondents implicitly came up with that [\$5,000] threshold themselves” (Robertson 2025b, 13). Neither of these statements regarding the \$5,000 treatment condition is a reasonable interpretation of his results.

Simply put, Robertson’s research does not support the conclusion that \$5,000 is an inflection point where voters start to become concerned about corruption. At best, his research suggests that the amount could be anywhere from \$501 to \$5,000. Here’s why. If respondents were given the choice to pick any value for a contribution that would be the magic number for inducing corruption, and if Robertson noticed a major jump at \$5,000, then he could make an argument for \$5,000 being an inflection point. But all he shows is that there is a statistically significant difference (i.e., the difference is not due to chance) between \$5,000 and three lower values: \$5, \$50, and \$500. He does not include any values between \$500 and \$5,000 in his experiment, so we cannot know whether those values in between are, in fact, the inflection point. Robertson does not have enough evidence to conclude that \$5,000 is that magic number.

Here is an analogy. Imagine that researchers conducted a study where they randomly assigned people to consume 1, 2, 3, 14, 15, 16, 17, or 18 alcoholic drinks per week and found higher levels of a particular illness in individuals who consumed 14, 15, 16, 17, or 18 drinks per week compared with individuals who consumed 1, 2, or 3 drinks per week. The researchers then announced that 14 drinks per week is an inflection point at which disease risk increases. It does not take methodological expertise to see why that conclusion would be unwarranted.

This misinterpretation, important as it is, is not even the most remarkable part of his experiment. Rather, this is: Figure 1 of his report shows that respondents believe *a \$50,000,000*

contribution creates the same risk of corruption as a \$5,000 contribution. (Table 1 in his report can be disregarded because he assumes linearity in the treatment condition effects, when it is clear from the figure that the effects are nonlinear. In technical terms, his regression model is misspecified.) Even if we were to make the erroneous logical leap described earlier—that if somebody views a contribution of \$X as corrupt, then that justifies limiting contributions to below \$X—the \$5,000 contribution limit at issue in this case would have no effect on the appearance of corruption because a legal \$5,000 contribution is viewed as equally likely to be corrupting as a \$50,000,000 contribution. Robertson acknowledged this fact in a deposition, stating that “there’s not a significant difference” between the estimates because the confidence intervals overlap (which, in layman’s terms, means that we can’t rule out that the differences are due to chance) (Robertson 2025b, 51). He went on to say that his study “wasn’t really designed” to “make those particular distinctions” between amounts of \$5,000 and above (Robertson 2025b, 51). But that seems to be *exactly* what he claimed his study could do: distinguish among competing contribution amounts and their corruption risk.

ROBERTSON’S EXPERIMENT 2 LACKS EXTERNAL VALIDITY AND IS DESIGNED, INTENTIONALLY OR NOT, TO GENERATE A PARTICULAR SET OF FINDINGS.

Experiment 2 creates a dystopian state known as Ames that we know very little about, except that donors want something from elected officials, such as having the state government “spend money to support a particular industry or de-regulate [sic] a particular industry” (Robertson 2025a, 8). The results are unsurprising because, as one respondent commented during the survey, “It feels like they’re corrupt and all about money. It feels like oligarchy” (Robertson 2025a, 12). Of course it does, because that is all the respondents are told about Ames. It is hardly surprising that voters don’t think very highly of Ames or its politicians. It is also not surprising that they would want to see fewer contributions in Ames, since all they know about it is that a bunch of greedy corporations are out there trying to buy favors from politicians—maybe even after being directed to do so by the politicians themselves.

One wonders how the results would have changed if, for instance, this description—
"Contributions to these IECs may come from major donors who want official actions from elected officials, such as having the state government spend money to support a particular industry or de-regulate [sic] a particular industry"—were replaced by this description—"Contributions to these IECs may come from public-spirited donors who want to help elected officials make government more effective, preserve the environment while also promoting a vibrant and innovative economy where small businesses can thrive, and make the public education system work for all students."

Robertson's vignettes about Ames and my rewriting of those vignettes are examples of what survey researchers call framing effects. Chong and Druckman define "framing effects" as occurring "when (often small) changes in the presentation of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion" (Chong and Druckman 2007, 104). Framing effects are well-documented in studies of money in politics. For instance, in Primo and Milyo (2020), we conduct a survey experiment where half the sample is given a question about Super PACs that reads as follows: "Do you think campaign contributions to political groups that are independent of candidates or political parties should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment?" (Primo and Milyo 2020, 186). The other half is given this prompt: "Do you think the ability of individuals to provide financial support to political groups that are independent of candidates or political parties should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment?" (Primo and Milyo 2020, 186). When framed in terms of "campaign contributions," 30% support protections for Super PAC contributions. When framed in terms of "financial support," 64% support these protections (Primo and Milyo 2020, 63). Similarly stark differences are seen for lobbying and other forms of money in politics.

To give just one more example in the campaign finance context, Druckman and Nelson (2003) show that when asked to read an article about the McCain-Feingold campaign finance bill—which strengthened campaign finance restrictions, especially with regard to "soft money" contributions to

political parties—respondents who read an article framing the bill around free speech considerations were much less favorable to the bill than respondents who read an article framing the bill around managing special interest influence.

It might be said that Robertson picked a “bribery frame” in his experiment, leading respondents to latch on to that consideration in their replies. Robertson’s bribery frame explains why nearly 80% of respondents saw corruption in independent expenditures even when they were capped at \$5,000 (i.e., at Maine’s current legal limit). It explains why they saw even more potential for corruption when those contributions were not capped.

Robertson made other questionable choices in both the design and analysis of this second experiment. By reporting the results in terms of the people who *disagree* that politicians will be corrupted by independent expenditures, Robertson makes the effects in Figure 2 look much more impressive than they are. A reader quickly glancing at the figure could be forgiven for thinking, “Whoa, limits make a huge difference!” The reality is that in both scenarios, voters think the whole operation in Ames is suspect, consistent with the bribery frame Robertson constructed. It is also puzzling that Robertson chose to ask respondents in the second experiment about just one limit—\$5,000—when in the first experiment he created many more treatment groups. The lack of parallel structure makes it hard to argue, as Robertson does, that the two experiments “complement each other” (Robertson 2025a, 13).

The most concerning aspect of the second experiment is that it lacks any context about the candidates, the donors, or the overall political system—and therefore lacks external validity for the purposes the author has laid out for the experiment. Robertson claims he could “have fairly called this a conjoint experiment” (Robertson 2025b, 79). It is surprising he thinks this, because one of the papers he cites, Spencer and Theodoridis (2020), presents the results from an actual conjoint experiment. The authors write, “A conjoint experiment randomly manipulates multiple variables simultaneously, thus

leveraging the randomization to ‘hold other conditions constant’ by design” (Spencer and Theodoridis 2020, 518). Why set up an experiment about campaign finance in this way? “The inclusion of this range of factors [such as candidate gender], some of which directly relate to campaign finance and others of which may not, is intended to increase the verisimilitude of the task and, thus, the external validity of our results ... [This] makes our task more similar to the real-world information environment in which voters evaluate candidates” (Spencer and Theodoridis 2020, 519). Robertson’s work is *not* a conjoint experiment.

While a conjoint experiment is not the only way to create external validity in an experiment, *some* real-world verisimilitude is important. Robertson’s context-free scenario is a far cry from “the real-world information environment” in which voters operate. The experiment lacks external validity and is not a reliable gauge of how voters will assess the impact of campaign finance laws in a real-world setting.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Christopher Robertson’s expert report provides a misleading summary of the literature on campaign finance and public opinion, and the experiments he conducts are flawed in several fundamental respects.

The existing literature studying real-world campaign finance laws finds that contribution limits have virtually no effect on Americans’ perception of government. Research I conducted for a book-length treatment of this question also shows that *Citizens United*, which eliminated limits on independent expenditures by corporations and opened the door for the creation of Super PACs, similarly had no effect on Americans’ perceptions of government. Robertson failed to address these findings in his expert report—a crucial oversight.

The survey experiments conducted by Robertson are flawed both in their design and in how he interprets the results. These experiments do *not* establish that a \$5,000 contribution is an “inflection

point” for corruption risk, and they do *not* establish that implementing a \$5,000 contribution limit on Super PAC contributions will reduce the appearance of corruption. These experiments instead show that respondents think contributions made at the contribution limit at issue in this case—\$5,000—are as corrupting as a \$50 million contribution. These experiments also show that if you provide respondents with no information about a fictional state except that it is filled with corporations seeking to buy venal politicians, then they will prefer less money in that system.

In my opinion, the experiments conducted by Christopher Robertson for this case do not advance the scientific literature on campaign finance and public opinion. If I were reviewing his report as an article submission for a peer-reviewed scientific journal, I would recommend rejection.

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ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS

University of Rochester

- Current Appointments
 - Ani and Mark Gabrellian Professor, Oct. 2012 – Present
 - Professor of Political Science (with tenure), Department of Political Science, Feb. 2020 – Present
 - Professor of Business Administration (joint appointment), Simon Business School, Feb. 2020 – Present
 - Associate Department Chair and Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, July 2022 – Present
- Previous Appointments
 - Associate Professor (with tenure), Department of Political Science, Sept. 2008 – Jan. 2020
 - Associate Professor (joint appointment), Simon Business School, July 2011– Jan. 2020
 - Associate Department Chair and Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, July 2010 – June 2017 (on leave July 2011– June 2012)
 - Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, July 2002 – Aug. 2008

Stanford University

- Acting Instructor, Department of Public Policy, April 2002 - June 2002

EDUCATION

Stanford University

- PhD, Political Science, June 2002
- MA, Economics, January 2001

Brown University

- MA, Political Science, May 1998
- BA with highest degree distinction, Economics and Honors Political Science, May 1998
- Phi Beta Kappa, 1997

BOOKS

Primo, David M., and Jeffrey D. Milyo. 2020. *Campaign Finance and American Democracy: What the Public Really Thinks and Why It Matters*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Clarke, Kevin A., and David M. Primo. 2012. *A Model Discipline: Political Science and the Logic of Representations*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Primo, David M. 2007. *Rules and Restraint: Government Spending and the Design of Institutions*. American Politics and Political Economy Series. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Cobb, Roger W., and David M. Primo. 2003. *The Plane Truth: Airline Crashes, the Media, and Transportation Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

JOURNAL PUBLICATIONS

Prabhat, Saumya, and David M. Primo. 2019. "Risky Business: Do Disclosure and Shareholder Approval of Corporate Political Contributions Affect Firm Performance?" *Business and Politics* 21(2):205-239.

JOURNAL PUBLICATIONS (cont.)

Jo, Jinhee, David M. Primo, and Yoji Sekiya. 2017. "Policy Dynamics and Electoral Uncertainty in the Appointments Process." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 29(1):124-148.

Carroll, Robert J., David M. Primo, and Brian K. Richter. 2016. "Using Item Response Theory to Improve Measurement in Strategic Management Research: An Application to Corporate Social Responsibility." *Strategic Management Journal* 37(1):66-85.

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Primo, David M., and Wm Scott Green. 2011. "Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship." *Entrepreneurship Research Journal* 1(2):Art. 5.

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Primo, David M. 2010. "The Effect of Initiatives on Local Government Spending." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 22(1):6-25.

Primo, David M., Sarah A. Binder, and Forrest Maltzman. 2008. "Who Consents? Competing Pivots in Federal Judicial Selection." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(3):471-489.

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Primo, David M. 2007. "A Comment on Baron and Ferejohn (1989): The Open Rule Equilibrium and Coalition Formation." *Public Choice* 130(1):129-135.

Primo, David M. 2006. "Stop Us Before We Spend Again: Institutional Constraints on Government Spending." *Economics & Politics* 18(3):269-312.

Primo, David M., and Jeffrey Milyo. 2006. "Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States." *Election Law Journal* 5(1):23-39.

Primo, David M. 2002. "Rethinking Political Bargaining: Policymaking with a Single Proposer." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 18(2):411-427.

Primo, David M. 2002. "Public Opinion and Campaign Finance: Reformers Versus Reality." *The Independent Review* 7(2):207-219.

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Primo, David M. 2002. "Budgetary Reform and Formal Modeling: A Comment on Gabel and Hager." *Public Choice* 113(1-2):225-230.

Milyo, Jeffrey, David Primo, and Timothy Groseclose. 2000. "Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective." *Business and Politics* 2(1):75-88.

PAPERS UNDER REVIEW AND WORK IN PROGRESS

"The Ideological Sorting Behavior of the Managerial Elite" (under review, with Jake Jares, David Gaddis Ross, and Seo Eun Yang)

"Are Businesspeople Effective Legislators?" (under review, with Jason Altmire and David Gaddis Ross)

"A Longitudinal Analysis of Trust in Higher Education" (with Henry Brady and Jamie Druckman)

"Independent Expenditures and Trust in Government" (with Jeff Milyo)

PUBLICATIONS IN EDITED VOLUMES AND TEXTBOOKS

Primo, David M. 2017. "Analyzing the Evidence: Why Congress Can't Make Ends Meet." In *American Government: Power and Purpose*, 14th ed., Theodore J. Lowi, Benjamin Ginsberg, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Stephen Ansolabehere. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., pages vary depending on version.

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Milyo, Jeffrey, David M. Primo, and Matthew L. Jacobsmeier. 2011. "Does Public Financing of State Election Campaigns Increase Voter Turnout?" In *Public Financing in American Elections*, ed. Costas Panagopoulos. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 225-237.

Primo, David M., Jeffrey Milyo, and Tim Groseclose. 2006. "State Campaign Finance Reform, Competitiveness, and Party Advantage in Gubernatorial Elections." In *The Marketplace of Democracy: Electoral Competition and American Politics*, eds. Michael P. McDonald and John Samples. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 268-285.

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POLICY PAPERS, REPORTS, AMICUS BRIEFS, AND TESTIMONY

Primo, David M., and Jeffrey D. Milyo. 2024. Amicus Brief in *No on E v. Chiu* (filed with the US Supreme Court).

Primo, David M. 2024. "What Social Science Tells Us About Forced Donor Disclosure." Special Report, Philanthropy Roundtable.

POLICY PAPERS, REPORTS, AMICUS BRIEFS, AND TESTIMONY (cont.)

Primo, David M. 2023. "Constitutional Restraints on the Federal Budget." Testimony prepared for a hearing of the US House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution and Limited Government, September 19.

Contributor to Persily, Nathaniel, Robert F. Bauer, and Benjamin L. Ginsberg. 2018. "Campaign Finance in the United States: Assessing an Era of Fundamental Change." Report, Bipartisan Policy Center.

Milyo, Jeffrey D., and David M. Primo. 2017. "Public Attitudes and Campaign Finance: Report for the Campaign Finance Task Force." Distributed by the Bipartisan Policy Center as a companion to the 2018 report cited above.

Primo, David M. 2017. "The Need for Constitutional Budget Reform." Testimony prepared for a hearing of the US House Committee on the Judiciary, July 27.

Primo, David M., and Jake Jares. 2017. Series of "Mercatus on Policy" Reports regarding state constitutions and fiscal policy. Mercatus Center at George Mason University.

- "Education Innovation, Fiscal Policy, and State Constitutions"
- "Education Policymaking from the Bench: Lessons from New Jersey and Connecticut"
- "Florida, High-Speed Rail, and the Perils of Policymaking by Constitution"
- "Illinois's Constitutional Pension Protections, with Lessons for New Jersey"
- "Too Much of a Good Thing? Initiatives and the 'Cluttered' Colorado Constitution"
- "Unfunded Mandates and State Constitutions: Lessons from Florida"

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Primo, David M. 2011. "Full Disclosure: How Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws Fail to Inform Voters and Stifle Public Debate." Research Report, Institute for Justice.

Primo, David M. 2011. "Should the Constitution Be Amended to Address the Federal Deficit?" Testimony prepared for a hearing of the US House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, May 13.

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PUBLISHED BUSINESS SCHOOL CASES (ORIGINALLY STANFORD GSB CASES)

Primo, David, and Romain Wacziarg. 2002. "CSN and Steel Antidumping (A)." In *Business and Its Environment*, 4th ed., by David P. Baron. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 215-217.

Primo, David, and Romain Wacziarg. 2002. "CSN and Steel Antidumping (B)." In *Business and Its Environment Instructor's Manual with Test Item File*, 4th ed., by David P. Baron and Anne Cowden. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 138-139.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Clarke, Kevin A., and David M. Primo. 2012. "The Modeling Enterprise in Comparative Politics." *APSA Comparative Politics Section Newsletter* 22(2):8-9. Adapted version appeared as "The Modeling Enterprise in International Relations" in e-International Relations (www.e-ir.info), June 2013.

Primo, David M., and Jeffrey Milyo. 2007. "Public Financing of Campaigns: A Statistical Analysis." *Engage* 8:96-100.

HONORS (2003-Present)

Finalist, Educational Innovation Award (Online/Hybrid Design), Simon Business School, University of Rochester, 2022

Edward Peck Curtis Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching, University of Rochester, 2018

Honorable Mention (one of the top 5 papers), Best Paper Prize, 34th Annual International Conference of the Strategic Management Society, 2014, for "Using Item Response Theory to Improve Measurement in Strategic Management Research: An Application to Corporate Social Responsibility" (with Rob Carroll and Brian Richter)

Alan Rosenthal Prize for *Rules and Restraint* (best publication in legislative studies by a young scholar during 2007 of importance to legislators and legislative staff and of merit in strengthening the practice of representative democracy), Legislative Studies Section, American Political Science Association, 2008

Goergen Award for Distinguished Achievement and Artistry in Undergraduate Education, University of Rochester, 2005

Undergraduate Professor of the Year, University of Rochester Students' Association Award, 2005

GRANTS

The Paul E. Singer Foundation, Politics and Markets Project, 2013-Present.

Institute for Humane Studies, "A Longitudinal Analysis of Trust in Higher Education," 2025.

Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation, Guest Speakers Grant, 2010.

University of Rochester, Kauffman Course Development Grant, "Politics and Markets: Innovation and the Global Business Environment," 2009.

National Science Foundation, Award SES-0314786, "The Design and Enforcement of Legislative Budget Rules," 2003-07.

University of Rochester Center for Entrepreneurship, Research Grant, "Tolerance for Failure, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Performance," 2006-07.

Initiative and Referendum Institute at USC and USC-Caltech Center for the Study of Law and Politics, Research Stipend, "The Effect of Local Initiatives on State and Local Finance," 2006-07.

Earhart Foundation, Fellowship Research Grant, "Rules and Restraint: Government Spending and the Design of Institutions," 2006.

Smith Richardson Foundation, Domestic Public Policy Research Fellowship, "Rules and Restraint: Government Budgets and the Enforcement Problem," 2005-06.

CONFERENCE PAPERS (2004-Present)

"Does the Political Engagement of Top Managers Affect Firm Performance?" Co-authored with Jake Jares, David Gaddis Ross, and Seoeun Yang. Presented by Primo at the 18th Annual Strategy and the Business Environment (SBE) Conference, April 20-21, 2018.

"Risky Business: Do Disclosure and Shareholder Approval of Corporate Political Spending Affect Stock Volatility and Value?" Co-authored with Saumya Prabhat. Presented by Primo and Prabhat at the 2016 Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, May 20-21, 2016, by Prabhat at the 2015 MIT Asia Conference in Accounting, July 13-14, 2015, and by Primo (remotely) at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28-31, 2014, with various titles.

"Corporate Social and Financial Performance Revisited: On Measures, Methods, and Interpretations." Co-authored with Robert J. Carroll and Brian Kelleher Richter. Presented by Richter at the 15th Annual Strategy and the Business Environment (SBE) Conference, May 1-2, 2015, and the 2015 International Association of Business and Society, March 12-15, 2015.

"Using Item Response Theory to Improve Measurement in Strategic Management Research: An Application to Corporate Social Responsibility." Co-authored with Robert J. Carroll and Brian Kelleher Richter. Presented by Richter at the Annual International Conference of the Strategic Management Society, September 20-23, 2014 and at the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, August 1-5, 2014, and by Primo at the Annual Strategy and the Business Environment (SBE) Conference, April 21-22, 2014.

"Earmarks and Representation." Co-authored with Gary Hollibaugh, Larry Rothenberg, and Kristin Rulison. Presented by Hollibaugh at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 11-14, 2013.

CONFERENCE PAPERS (2004-Present) (cont.)

"Distributive Politics and Primary Elections." Co-authored with Chris Berry and Jim Snyder. Presented by Berry at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 12-15, 2012.

"Voter ID Laws and Turnout." Co-authored with Jonathan Klingler and Jeff Milyo. Presented by Klingler and Primo at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, March 31-April 3, 2011.

A Dynamic Model of Judicial Appointments." Co-authored with Yoji Sekiya. Presented by Primo at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 2-5, 2009, and by Primo and Sekiya at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 3-6, 2009.

"The Bad News About 'Going Public.'" Co-authored with Stu Jordan. Presented by Jordan and Primo at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28-31, 2008.

"The Effect of Initiatives on Local Government Spending." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 12-15, 2007, and at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30 - September 2, 2007.

"Tolerance for Failure, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Performance." Co-authored with Bill Green. Presented by Primo at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 12-15, 2007.

"The Effects of Campaign Finance Laws on Turnout, 1950-2000." Co-authored with Jeff Milyo. Presented by Primo at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 31-September 3, 2006.

"Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and Government Spending." Co-authored with Jim Snyder. Presented by Primo at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 20-23, 2006.

"Party Strength and State Government Spending." Co-authored with Jim Snyder. Presented by Primo at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, 2005.

"Modernizing Political Science: A Model-Based Approach." Co-authored with Kevin Clarke. Presented by Clarke at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 7-10, 2005, and by Clarke and Primo at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, June 2-4, 2005.

"Public Goods and the Law of 1/n." Co-authored with Jim Snyder. Presented by Primo at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 7-10, 2005.

"Restrictive Rules, Restrained Spending: The Endogenous Enforcement of Budget Rules in Legislatures." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-5, 2004.

"The Theoretical Implications of the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models." Co-authored with Kevin Clarke. Presented by Clarke at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-5, 2004.

"Open vs. Closed Rules in Budget Legislation: A Result and an Application." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, March 11-14, 2004, and at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 15-18, 2004.

"State Campaign Finance Laws and the Turnout Decision." Co-authored with Jeff Milyo. Presented by Primo at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, March 11-14, 2004, and by Milyo at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 15-18, 2004.

INVITED UNIVERSITY PRESENTATIONS (2004-Present)

Western University, Ivey Business School, Ivey Research Series, May 15, 2018

University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business, Applied Economics Workshop, March 27, 2015

University of Texas at Austin, McCombs School of Business, March 26, 2015

George Washington University, School of Business, February 20, 2015

Yale University, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Show Me the Money: How Transparency in Political Donations Could Change American Elections, November 10, 2014

Yale University, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Purchasing Power: Money, Politics and Inequality Conference, May 6, 2013

George Mason University, Economic Liberty Lecture Series, April 1, 2013

Washington University in St. Louis, Political Science Department Seminar, March 19, 2009

George Mason University, Economics Department Seminar, November 6, 2008

Kauffman Foundation, Summer Legal Institute, July 10-13, 2008

London School of Economics, PSPE Conference on Designing Democratic Institutions, May 13-14, 2008

University of Maryland, Economics Department Seminar, May 5, 2008

University of Chicago, The Harris School's American Politics Workshop, May 14, 2007

University of Southern California Conference, When Voters Make Laws: How Direct Democracy is Reshaping American Cities, April 6-7, 2007

University of Miami, Joint Political Science and Economics Seminar, February 22, 2007

Brookings Institution and Cato Institute Conference, The Marketplace of Democracy, March 9, 2006

University of Wisconsin, Madison, Conference on Public Election Funding, January 28-29, 2006

Cornell University, Joint Government and Economics Workshop, November 4, 2004

COURSES TAUGHT

University of Rochester (undergraduate unless otherwise specified)

American Political Institutions (PhD), Spring 2023

American Politics Field Seminar (PhD), Fall 2009, Fall 2007, Fall 2003

Business and Politics, Spring 2024, Spring 2022, Spring 2020, Fall 2015, Fall 2014, Fall 2013, Fall 2012, Fall 2009, Spring 2009, Spring 2008, Spring 2007, Spring 2005, Spring 2004, Fall 2002

Corporate Political Strategy (PhD), Fall 2016, Spring 2014

COURSES TAUGHT (cont.)

University of Rochester (undergraduate unless otherwise specified)(cont.)

Disagreement in a Democratic Society, Fall 2024, Spring 2024, Fall 2022, Spring 2022, Spring 2020

Ethics & Policy in Tech (MSBA), Spring 2023

Experience Simon Module: Corporate Strategy and Politics (MBA/MS), Fall 2012

Introduction to Positive Political Theory, Fall 2008, Fall 2007, Fall 2004, Spring 2004, Fall 2002

Models in American Politics: Theory & Data (PhD), Fall 2010, Fall 2008, Fall 2006

Money in Politics, Fall 2004, Fall 2003

The Nature of Entrepreneurship, Spring 2010, Spring 2008, Spring 2007, Spring 2005

Pandemic Politics, Fall 2023, Fall 2021

Politics and Markets: Innovation and the Global Business Environment, Spring 2025, Spring 2023, Spring 2021, Spring 2019, Fall 2016, Spring 2013, Fall 2010, Spring 2010

Strategy Beyond Markets (MBA), Fall 2024, Fall 2023, Fall 2022, Fall 2021, Fall 2020, Fall 2019, Fall 2018

Stanford University: Business and Public Policy (undergraduate), Spring 2002

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Additional Appointments and Affiliations

Senior Affiliated Scholar, The Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2010-Present

Editorial Board, *American Politics Research*, 2006-Present

Board of Academic Advisors, Institute for Free Speech (formerly Center for Competitive Politics), 2006-Present

Rochester Center for Economic Research, University of Rochester, 2003-Present

W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy, University of Rochester, 2002-19

Additional Conference Participation (2006-Present, also see Conference Papers and Invited Presentations)

"Measurement Issues in the Study of Corporate Political Activity," Corporate America and Partisan Divisions Conference Sponsored by the Institute for Humane Studies, 2024

Authors Meet Critics Panel for *Campaign Finance and American Democracy: What the Public Really Thinks and Why It Matters*, APSA Meeting, 2023

Discussant, Strategy and the Business Environment Conference, 2020

Plenary Session Presentation, "(Budget) Rules Are Made to Be Broken: Can We Fix Them?," Public Choice Conference, 2018

Discussant, Conference on "How Incomplete Is the Theory of the Firm?," Stigler Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, 2017

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES (cont.)

Additional Conference Participation (2006-Present, also see Conference Papers and Invited Presentations) (cont.)

Roundtable Participant, US Federal Campaign Finance in a Time of Transition, APSA Meeting, 2016

Discussant, Cornell Political Economy Conference, 2016

Discussant, Campaign Finance Law and Politics after Citizens United v. FEC, APSA Meeting, 2010

Discussant, Influences on Congressional Voting, APSA Meeting, 2010

Discussant, Washington University in St. Louis, Federal Budget and Tax Policy for a Sound Fiscal Future Conference, 2009.

Discussant, Partisanship and Bipartisanship in the US Congress, APSA Meeting, 2009

Discussant, Strategic Choices in Comparative Legislatures, APSA Meeting, 2008

Chair and Discussant, Lobbyists and Legislatures, Midwest Meeting, 2008

Chair and Discussant, The Political Economy of Legislatures, APSA Meeting, 2007

Discussant, The Effects of Institutions and Rules on State and Local Politics, Midwest Meeting, 2007

Roundtable Participant, The Marketplace of Democracy: Electoral Competition in the United States, APSA Meeting, 2006

Selected Department and University Service (University of Rochester)

Director of Graduate Placement, 2018-22, 2023-24, 2024-25

Member, Undergraduate Business Program Advisory Board, Feb. 2017-Present

Member, Methods/American Politics Search Committee, 2014-15

Member, Applied Political Economy Search Committee, 2010-11, 2009-10, 2006-07

Chair, American Politics and Methodology Search Committee, 2004-05

Chair, American Politics Search Committee, 2003-04

Co-Chair, Graduate Admissions, Incoming 2010 Class

Co-organizer (with John Duggan and Tasos Kalandrakis), Wallis Institute 14th and 17th Annual Conferences on Political Economy, 2007 and 2010

Co-organizer (with Gretchen Helmke and Stu Jordan), Wallis Institute Mini-Conference on Positive Political Theory and the Law, 2009

Organizer, American Politics Working Group, 2007-09

Faculty Ambassador, Office of Advancement, 2012-14

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES (cont.)

Other Professional Service

Secretary-Treasurer, Political Economy Section, American Political Science Association, 2016-18

Program Committee, 20th – 24th Annual Strategy and the Business Environment Conference, 2020-24

Co-organizer (with Mark Zupan), 16th Annual Strategy and the Business Environment Conference, 2016

Member, Alan Rosenthal Prize Committee, APSA Legislative Studies Section, 2009 award

Member, Best Paper Prize Committee, APSA Political Economy Section, 2011 award

Peer Reviewing: American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, American Politics Research, British Journal of Political Science, Economics & Politics, Election Law Journal, Electoral Studies, European Journal of Political Economy, Independent Review, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Legal Studies, Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, Journal of Politics, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Management Science, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, National Tax Journal, Operations Research, Oxford University Press, Party Politics, Political Analysis, Political Behavior, Political Research Quarterly, Political Science Research and Methods, Princeton University Press, PS: Political Science & Politics, Public Choice, Public Opinion Quarterly, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, SAGE Publications, Social Choice and Welfare, Social Science Quarterly, Southern Economic Journal, State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Strategic Management Journal, Strategy Science, Time-Sharing Experiments in the Social Sciences (TESS)

Legal Consulting (*indicates deposition given or testified at trial)

*Lopez v. Griswold (United States District Court, District of Colorado, Case 1:22-cv-00247-SKC)

*Ostrewich v. Hollins (United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, Case 4:19-cv-715)

Upstate Jobs Party v. Kosinski (United States District Court, New York Northern District, Case 6:18-cv-00459)

*State of Washington v. Grocery Manufacturers Association (Thurston County Superior Court, Washington State, Case 13-2-02156-8)

Seaton v. Wiener (United States District Court, District of Minnesota, Case 14-CV-1016 DWF/JSM)

Justice v. Hosemann (United States District Court, Northern District of Mississippi, Case 13-60754)

Worley v. Detzner (United States District Court, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division, Case 4:10cv423-RH/CAS)

*McComish v. Bennett (United States District Court, District of Arizona, Case CV08-1550-PHX-ROS)

*McConnell v. FEC (United States District Court, District of Columbia, Case 02-CV-582 (CKK, KLH, RJL), Consolidated Action)

Other Consulting

Facebook

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES (cont.)

Media Appearances, Quotations, Citations, and Op-eds (National and International)

1A, ABC Radio (Australia), AFP, Associated Press, Bloomberg Brazil, Bloomberg News, Bloomberg Radio, Bloomberg TV, Chicago Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Chronicle of Higher Education, CNBC.com, CNN.com, Cointelegraph, Computerworld, CQ Today, CQ Researcher, CQ Weekly Report, Credit Union Journal, Fast Company, Forbes.com, The Hill, Huffington Post, Inside Higher Ed, International Business Times, Law360, Los Angeles Times, El Nacional (Venezuela), NPR's Marketplace, National Public Radio, The National Desk, National Review, NBC's Today Show, New Republic, New Statesman America, News Italia Press, NewsNation Now, Newsweek, New York Magazine, New York Times, PolitiFact, Quartz, RealClearMarkets, Reason, Reuters, Roll Call, SiriusXM Radio, The Takeaway, Times (London), USA Today, US News & World Report, Voice of America, Wall Street Journal, WalletHub, Washington Examiner, Washington Free Beacon

Media Appearances, Quotations, and Op-eds (Local and Regional)

Print and Online: Albany Times Union, Baltimore Sun, Boston Globe, Boston Herald, Buffalo News, Capital News Service (MD), Cincinnati Enquirer, Colorado Springs Gazette, Cook County (IL) Record, Dallas Morning News, Delaware News Journal, Houston Chronicle, Las Vegas Sun, Newsday (New York), New York Daily Record, Oklahoman, Orlando Sentinel, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, Rochester Business Journal, Rochester Democrat and Chronicle

TV and Radio: NBC 10 TV (Rochester), 13 WHAM TV (Rochester), R News/YNN TV (Rochester), KCBS Radio (San Francisco), KHOW Radio (Denver), WHAM Radio (Rochester), WCNY Radio (Syracuse), WNYC Radio (New York Public Radio), WPR Radio (Wisconsin Public Radio), WWL Radio (New Orleans), WXXI Radio (Rochester)

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