Subgrades  
Covered Speech: A+
Anti-SLAPP Procedures: A-
Subscores  
Covered Speech: 100 out of 100 points
Anti-SLAPP Procedures: 91 out of 100 points
Detailed Scoring on Anti-SLAPP Procedures  
Suspension of Court Proceedings Upon an Anti-SLAPP Motion: 18 of 20 points
Burden of Proof on Plaintiff to Defeat an Anti-SLAPP Motion: 12 of 12 points
Right to an Immediate Appeal: 25 of 25 points
Award of Costs and Attorney Fees: 36 of 40 points
Expansive Statutory Interpretation Instruction to Courts: 0 of 3 points

State Anti-SLAPP Statute

Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute[1] protects (1) statements made before a legislative, executive, or judicial body, (2) statements made before any legally authorized official proceeding, (3) statements made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, (4) statements made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by any legally authorized official proceeding, (5) statements made in public or in a public forum made in connection with an issue of public interest, and (6) any other conduct or communication that furthers rights of free speech or petition in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. This language has been interpreted broadly by a state appellate court.[2] (However, the statute also carves out several content-related exemptions from the broad principles stated above, such as those related to selling or leasing goods and services.) Although discovery is stayed once an anti-SLAPP motion is filed, a court may nonetheless order that specified discovery be conducted if good cause is shown. To prevail against an anti-SLAPP motion, the respondent must establish that there is a “reasonable likelihood”[3] of prevailing at trial. The statute provides for interlocutory appeal of an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion. Generally, a court must award costs and attorney fees to the prevailing movant on an anti-SLAPP motion; conversely, if the court finds the motion to be frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, then it must award costs and attorney fees to the prevailing respondent. 

[1] Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-20-1101. 

[2] L.S.S. v. S.A.P., 523 P.3d 1280, 2022 COA 123 (Colo. App. Division V, 2022).

[3] Consistent with the appellate courts of other states, the Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted this term as synonymous, in its meaning, with “reasonable probability.” See Salazar v. Pub. Tr. Inst., 522 P.3d 242, 2022 COA 109 (Colo. App. 2022), and L.S.S. v. S.A.P., 523 P.3d at 1286n3.

Dan Greenberg, David Keating, & Helen Knowles-Gardner

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