In the Washington Post, political science professors Bertram J. Levine and Michael Johnston offer a somewhat unusual proposal for reforming campaign finance disclosure laws: make all contributions anonymous.

This proposal first gained widespread attention with a book by Ian Ayres and Bruce Ackerman in 2002, “Voting With Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance.” The suggestion continues to bubble up from time to time and has some appeal. It recognizes that the biggest stated benefit of disclosure – informing the public about who contributes and reducing the possibility for corrupt dealings between politicians and contributors– is also its biggest drawback: it is an officeholder’s knowledge of the sources of contributions that potentially gives the donor leverage to influence the officeholder. And it would seem to solve one major problem with disclosure laws: the invasion of donors’ privacy and the risk of donor harassment. By mandating that contributions be made anonymously, the theory goes, politicians and contributors will be unable to coordinate corrupt deals, and donors will not have their privacy violated or be subjected to threats and intimidation from powerful government officials.

It’s admirable to see a proposal that takes seriously the dangers of disclosure by understanding its routine misuse. But in practice, like so many other attempts at campaign finance regulation, this suggestion just raises yet another set of First Amendment and practical concerns.

Constitutionally speaking, can the government prevent an individual from telling a candidate that he has made a contribution, or from showing someone a cancelled check? Freedom of speech and association still apply when you’re speaking and associating with candidates for public office.

Practically speaking, it’s difficult to see how anonymity could truly be achieved. Would there still be fundraising events and political rallies at which candidates and donors could meet and speak to one another? It’s unlikely that candidates would be unable to figure out who some of their supporters are. More likely, an attempt to disguise donor identity would be imperfect, shifting even more power and influence to the organizers of fundraising events and making the campaign finance system even more difficult for ordinary citizens to comprehend. Supporters of the idea argue that potential donors would have an incentive to lie to candidates about their donations, so that once elected, officials could not know for sure those who really offered financial support. But would it? Wouldn’t organizers have an incentive to make sure donations were real, thus increasing their influence? Would they be prohibited from publishing lists of attendees, if desired, or showing such lists to candidates?

We doubt that this would work, but even if it did, we’re not sure that a good political system aims to intentionally create distrust between officeholders and their supporters. Indeed, in many ways the connection between a candidate and their supporters is vital to a functioning political system. Driving an artificial wedge between them will leave candidates in the dark for substantial periods of time about what issues matter to supporters, and whether their fundraising efforts are succeeding. It would create a bevy of political offenses against the state, including showing a candidate a cancelled check or bank statement. Indeed, more than half of the Ackerman/Ayres book is devoted to explaining a complex regulatory scheme designed to make it hard for candidates to know who their supporters actually are.

Even if this was possible, would it really be desirable? Complex, opaque systems of campaign financing are prone to the greatest public misunderstanding and mistrust, including concerns about the honesty of the regulators. See: IRS scandal.  And creating a bunch of offenses out of honest political activity – and most political activity is honest – doesn’t increase public confidence in the integrity of government.

Credit goes to professors Levine and Johnston for thinking outside the box, but ultimately this proposal would transform campaign contributions and spending into state secrets. That’s not a good direction for a free and open political system.

Here’s a radical idea: just let people speak and associate freely. The United States did quite well, thank you, with no restrictions on individual giving and minimal disclosure laws on the books from 1776 through 1973. Attempts to amend our convoluted system of campaign finance regulation would be wise to follow the eloquent words of the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”